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ABSTRACT 
Merger and Collusion in Contests 
by Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad and Wieland Müller* 
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms 
cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their 
products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We 
show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success 
function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable. 
 
Keywords: Contests, merger, collusion, promotional competition 
JEL classification: D44, L11, L13 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Kollusion und Fusion in Contests 
In vielen Gütermärkten erfolgt der Wettbewerb zwischen Unternehmen nicht primär 
über Preise und Mengen, sondern über Verkaufsanstrengungen. Ein Beispiel hierfür ist 
der Kampf um Marktanteile und Kunden in Märkten mit hohen Werbeaufwendungen. 
Wenn Unternehmen in solchen Märkten kooperieren, müssen sie entscheiden, ob sie 
ihre gesamte Produktpalette beibehalten und ihre Verkaufsanstrengungen auf alle 
Produkte verteilen („Kollusion“) oder ob sie die Anzahl ihrer Produkte reduzieren 
(„Fusion“). Wir zeigen, daß diese Entscheidung von den Konvexitätseigenschaften der 
Funktion abhängt, die den Markterfolg eines Produkts in Abhängigkeit von den 
Verkaufsanstrengungen für dieses Produkt bzw. für die Konkurrenzprodukte bestimmt, 
und untersuchen die Bedingungen, in denen Kooperation in Form von „Kollusion“ oder 
„Fusion“ für die kooperierenden Unternehmen profitabel ist. 
 
Schlüsselbegriffe: Kampf um Marktanteile, Kollusion, Fusion 
                                                 
*  We thank Helmut Bester for valuable discussion. Konrad gratefully acknowledges financial 
support by the Norwegian Research Council (Nǽring, finans og marked programme). 
1 Introduction
Competition in product markets is sometimes well described by a contest,
particularly if competition via prices is not feasible. In such markets sellers
may contest with each other and spend resources in order to attract customers
to buy from them, and not from another seller. The type of eﬀort can diﬀer
from one market to another. It may take the form of visits, gifts, persuasive
talking, or invitations to conferences in fancy holiday resorts. The latter, for
example, is popular in the market for prescription drugs in countries with
health care systems. As prescription drugs are covered by health insurance,
regardless whether consumers or physicians make the consumption choice,
price competition is more or less ruled out.1 In other markets sales eﬀort
consists of mail and tv-advertising, or, as in the insurance retail business, of
visiting and persuasive talking to customers. Again, this becomes particu-
larly pronounced, if price competition is not feasible, which used to be the
case in many European insurance markets prior to deregulation on the EU
level in 1992.2 Prior to deregulation, the regulators protected insurance com-
panies from ruinous competition by regulating insurance premiums. Other
examples are persuasive advertising, glamorous shop outlets, and huge selec-
tions of goods, for instance in the retail market for books where price com-
petition in many countries is hindered by legal vertical price maintenance, or
promotional competition in the markets for cigarettes or beverages.3
1Producers use promotional eﬀort in these markets. They send sales representatives
and gifts to physicians, trying to persuade them to prescribe their products instead of com-
peting substitutes. For instance, Breyer and Zweifel (1999, p. 366) report that marketing
and product information were about 20 percent of revenue through sales in pharmacies
in Switzerland in the mid-eighties, almost half of these being marketing expenditure, and
argue that this percentage is much higher than that of other industries. Persuasive eﬀort
is important in the market for drugs, even for over-the-counter drugs. Sales promotion
eﬀort cost cannot be recovered, even if the eﬀort is not successful, turning competition in
these markets into a contest. Similarly, Scherer (2000, p. 1303) reports that for over-the-
counter drugs, sellers devoted 20.2 percent of their sales receipts to media advertising 
the highest share among 225 recorded industries.
2Rees and Kessner (1999), for instance, survey regulation in the German insurance
market prior to 1992. They report evidence for price regulation that led to prices that
considerably exceeded cost, leading to a contest in sales eﬀort that was suﬃciently strong
to make the regulator feel a need for regulating the maximum sales expenditure. The
regulator required that agents commissions were not to exceed 11 percent of premiums,
and total marketing expenditure was restricted to no more than 30 percent of premiums.
3Other important contest examples are Þrms competing for a monopoly as in R&D
contests (see, e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 1997), contests for quasi-monopoly due to net-
work externalities (Besen and Farrell 1994), litigation contests for brand names, internet
addresses or other exclusive assets that yield quasi-monopoly rents, exporting Þrms com-
peting for large scale projects as in Konrad (2000), or Þrms seeking special political favors
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Schmalensee (1976) observed and characterized this type of competition
in markets with few sellers and diﬀerentiated products: [P]rice competition
is relatively rare in such markets. Prices generally change infrequently, and
sellers compete, if at all, mainly through product variation and promotional
expenditures. It is thus of some interest to attempt to model rigorously
markets in which the only competition is of this sort (Schmalensee 1976,
p. 493). With promotional competition, Þrms spend eﬀort to attain some
payoﬀ or prize: for instance, a large share in a market in which price
exceeds marginal cost. Firms win a customer with some probability (or a
share in the total market on the aggregate level) as a function of the various
eﬀorts of all competing Þrms. These contests are all-pay auctions. Eﬀorts
are made (and sunk) before the customer makes its decision.
In this paper we consider cooperation among a subgroup of m Þrms in a
market with n (> m) Þrms that is characterized by this type of competition
and address two questions. First, we ask what are the factors determining
whether the group of cooperating Þrms will reduce their number of products.
For instance, Þrms often have established brands for close substitutes, and
have to decide whether to keep all brands after a merger or to abandon some
of them. If they keep all brands, we shall call this collusion. If they reduce
the number of brands, we shall call this a merger. Note that these notions
do not refer to the institutional form of cooperation, but simply to whether
the cooperating Þrms decide to reduce the number of their brands. Cigarette
markets are an example for what we call collusion here: the big Þrms have
multiple brands and, when advertising one of their brands, they take into
account that they partially cannibalize on their own other brands (Nguyen
1987). The U.S. soft drink industry, in contrast, is an example in which
Þrms seem to concentrate on single brand names. We ask how the type of
cooperation is determined by speciÞc characteristics of the contest.
Second, we ask whether cooperation in contests is proÞtable. The ques-
tion of proÞtability of merger or collusion of a subgroup of Þrms in an indus-
try has received considerable attention for the benchmark case in which sales
eﬀort is absent and it has been shown that, somewhat counterintuitively,
cooperation can harm cooperators.4
Barros and Sørgard (2000) also consider promotional competition, allow-
ing for some form of collusive price setting behavior. They consider only
merger and study the relationship between advertising and price collusion.
in rent-seeking contests, and the results in this paper could apply qualitatively to these
contests as well.
4Seminal papers on this benchmark case, considering Cournot competition or Bertrand
competition, are Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), Deneckere and Davidson (1985),
Gaudet and Salant (1991) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
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Their results are sensitive to the particular case of contest success function
they use for determining market shares. On a more general level, our results
relate to the discussion of cooperative rent-seeking. Dijkstra (1999) considers
several structures of cooperation in contests, allowing for matching grants,
delegation, and choices of diﬀerent roles for diﬀerent members of a cooper-
ating group of rent-seekers. In our paper the group of contestants collapses
into one single decision maker that maximizes the groups total payoﬀ.5
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we describe our basic model of promo-
tional competition: sales contests. In section 3 we consider the determinants
for whether Þrms merge or collude. In section 4 we consider proÞtability of
merger and collusion, and section 5 concludes.
2 Contests
Consider a market with n identical Þrms. Each Þrm oﬀers one product (or
brand). Suppose that these Þrms make eﬀorts in a contest for some prize
of size B. A few examples for this type of competition have been discussed
in the introduction. Each Þrm i chooses contest eﬀort xi ∈ [0,∞). These
eﬀorts are irreversibly spent by contestants before they know who wins the
contest. Contest eﬀorts determine Þrms probabilities qi of winning the prize,
according to a contest success function
qi(x1, ..., xn) =
(xi)
aPn
j=1(xj)
a
. (1)
In the context of promotional competition, this parametric form (1) has
been used to determine Þrms market shares as a function of advertising by
Schmalensee (1992, p. 131n.). This contest success function has been sug-
gested by Tullock (1980) in a more general context and is a special case of
more general contest success functions but has gained support by an axioma-
tization in Skaperdas (1996). A further microeconomic underpinning for the
speciÞc form of (1) is provided by Fullerton and McAfee (1999).6
5Indeed, if the cooperating Þrms could write arbitrary contracts on eﬀorts and proÞt
distributions, and if these contracts were credible and observed by the non-cooperating
group of contestants, the cooperating group could usually do better than in the merger
or collusion outcomes we consider. Diﬀerent from merger and collusion as discussed here,
however, delegation, matching grants, and other such arrangements would typically not
be re-negotiation proof at the interim stage.
6The function has been widely used to describe interest group competition, lobbying,
research and labor market tournaments and other types of competition. Baye, Kovenock
and deVries (1998) survey economic applications of contests and Nitzan (1994) surveys
the literature on Tullocks contest success function (1).
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The coeﬃcient a in (1) is called discriminatory power. It is a measure
of how much the contest outcome can be inßuenced by contest eﬀort, and
how much is left to chance.7 For instance, if a → 0, each contestant ends
up with the same qi, irrespective of contest eﬀorts. If, instead, a → ∞, (1)
approaches a contest success function in which the contestant who makes
the highest eﬀort wins the prize. We limit the discriminatory power to a
∈ [0, n
n−1) in order to have well-behaved optimization problems with equilibria
in pure strategies and Þrst-order conditions characterizing these equilibria.8
(We discuss brießy the case a→∞ in footnote 10.)
Firms are risk neutral. Their (expected) payoﬀs are
πi = qiB − xi. (2)
Firm i wins B with probability qi and spends contest eﬀort equal to xi. The
Þrst-order condition for Þrms maximizing their payoﬀs and symmetry can be
used to calculate the contest equilibrium eﬀorts
x∗(n) =
aB(n− 1)
n2
. (3)
The equilibrium share is 1/n for each contestant, yielding the equilibrium
payoﬀs
π∗(n) =
B
n
− aB(n− 1)
n2
. (4)
While Þrms contest for contracts with individual customers whose deci-
sions can be seen as a random function of sales eﬀort, with many identical
customers, qi can also be interpreted as Þrm is market share, and we will
make use of this interpretation in what follows.
3 Cooperation of a subgroup of firms
Consider a contest of n Þrms, each Þrm promoting one product (or brand) in
a sales contest. Supposem Þrms merge or collude. LetN be the set of all
7If qi is interpreted as a single customers probability to choose product i, and eﬀort is
promotional eﬀort vis-a-vis this customer, micro-data on Þrms eﬀorts on each customer
for a large set of customers and customers decisions could be used to estimate a. On the
aggregate level, qi could then be interpreted as Þrm is market share. Estimating a using
aggregate data is more diﬃcult, but a could be inferred from the degree of non-linearity
between market shares and sales eﬀort in this case. Thomas (1989) reports some type
of non-linearity, for instance, for the U.S. soft drink industry: brands having larger sales
exhibit lower ratios of advertising to sales.
8For the equilibrium (in mixed strategies) for the case of ∞ > a > n/(n− 1) see Baye,
Kovenock and deVries (1994). For a→∞ see Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996).
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Þrms and M be the set of Þrms that cooperate in one of these ways. Denote
by U = N\M the set of Þrms that do not participate in the cooperation.
We consider the following contest game. Each non-cooperating Þrm chooses
eﬀort xk in order to maximize its payoﬀ, and the set of cooperating Þrms
chooses a vector (x1, ..., xm) of sales eﬀorts in the m products in order to
maximize their joint proÞts. The total proÞt of the cooperating Þrms, πM ,
is given by
πM =
P
j∈M(xj)
aP
j∈M(xj)a +
P
k∈U(xk)a
B −
X
j∈M
xj (5)
while the proÞt, πu for each non-cooperating Þrm u ∈ U is
πu =
(xu)
aP
j∈M(xj)a +
P
k∈U(xk)a
B − xu. (6)
For the equilibrium we obtain
Proposition 1 The cooperating Þrms allocate the sum of their eﬀorts equally
among all products i ∈M if a < 1 and concentrate all eﬀort on one product
if a > 1. If a = 1, the allocation of eﬀorts between diﬀerent products i ∈ M
is indeterminate.
Proof. Suppose the M -group anticipates the vector of given equilibrium
eﬀort choices (xu1 , ..., xun−m) by non-cooperating Þrms. Whatever this vector
is, by (5), if a = 1, then πM solely depends on the sum of eﬀorts the cooper-
ating Þrms exert, i.e., on
P
i∈M xi. Accordingly, it does not matter how they
allocate their eﬀorts. If a > 1, the cooperating Þrms maximize the proba-
bility of winning by making use of the increasing returns to scale, i.e., by
concentrating all eﬀorts on one product. At the same time the cooperating
Þrms total costs only depend on the sum of eﬀorts. Hence, πM is maximized
if indeed all eﬀort is concentrated on one product. Finally, if a < 1 (i.e., with
decreasing returns to scale) it is straightforward to see that the total proÞt of
cooperating Þrms πM is maximized if the total group eﬀort is spread evenly
between all product lines. ¤
Note that the result in Proposition 1 generalizes to the broader class of
contest success functions with
qi =
f(xi)Pn
j=1 f(xj)
,
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provided that the equilibrium is in pure strategies and characterized by the
Þrst-order conditions: Firms merge if f is convex, and Þrms collude if f
is concave.
An important assumption underlying Proposition 1 is simultaneity: nei-
ther the cooperating Þrms choice of total equilibrium eﬀort nor the alloca-
tion of this amount between diﬀerent products becomes known to the non-
cooperating Þrms before they choose their own eﬀorts. Cooperating Þrms
may sometimes choose to close down a number of products and keep only
h ≤ m products when they decide to cooperate, and this may be observed
by the non-cooperating Þrms before all Þrms enter the actual contest game
of choosing eﬀorts. Proposition 1 states that in this case cooperating Þrms
would choose to spread eﬀort equally among the remaining h product lines
if a < 1, and to concentrate all eﬀort on one product if a > 1.9
4 Profitability
Consider now whether cooperation of a subgroup of Þrms is proÞtable for
this group. From Proposition 1 we know that cooperation essentially leads
to a situation in which the set of non-cooperating Þrms contest with one
single Þrm with one product if a > 1. If a < 1, Proposition 1 tells us that
the non-cooperating Þrms contest with one Þrm that has m products and
spends the same eﬀort on each product. Hence, we can consider proÞtability
of cooperation for the two cases separately.
4.1 High discriminatory power (a > 1)
Suppose m < n Þrms cooperate in a contest with a > 1. By Proposition 1
they spend eﬀort on only one of their products. Without cooperation the set
M of Þrms received a payoﬀ equal to mπ∗(n). With cooperation their payoﬀ
equals
π∗(n−m+ 1) = B
n−m+ 1 −
aB(n−m)
(n−m+ 1)2 .
9If a < 1, there is an advantage of having a large number of products, because the total
impact of a given budget xM =
P
j∈M xj is higher for a higher number h of products.
However, the equilibrium reaction of the non-cooperative Þrms must also be taken into
consideration. If the non-cooperating Þrms spend more eﬀort in the equilibrium if h is
large, the cooperating Þrms optimal choice of h becomes ambiguous. On the other hand,
if a > 1, the choice of h becomes irrelevant. In that case all Þrms anticipate that the
cooperating Þrms will concentrate all eﬀort on one product. Hence, the choice of h does
not matter as any choice h ≥ 1 yields the same payoﬀs.
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Now let g(n,m, a) be the function that measures the gain (or loss) of m
Þrms that merge in an industry composed of n Þrms, i.e., g(n,m, a) is given
by
g(n,m, a) = π∗(n−m+ 1)−mπ∗(n)
=
B
n−m+ 1 −
aB(n−m)
(n−m+ 1)2 −m
µ
B
n
− aB(n− 1)
n2
¶
,
and has the following properties:
(i) For all n ≥ 2 it holds that g(n, 1, a) = 0. (If one Þrm is joined by no other
in a merger, the proÞt doesnt change.)
(ii) For all n ≥ 2 and for all a > 0 it holds that g(n, n, a) = B
n
a(n− 1) > 0.
(Merger to monopoly is always proÞtable.)
(iii) For all n ≥ 2 it holds that ∂g(n,m,a)
∂m
¯¯¯
m=1
= B
n3
(2a+n−2an+an2−n2) S 0
iﬀ a S n(n−1)
(n−1)2+1
¡
< n
n−1 for n ≥ 2
¢
.
(iv) For all n ≥ 4 and for all a ∈ £0, n
n−1
¢
it holds that
∂2g(n,m, a)
∂m2
= 2B
n−m+ 1− a(n−m− 2)
(n−m+ 1)4 > 0,
i.e., g(n,m, a) is strictly convex (and also continuous) with regard to
m.
With the help of properties (i)− (iv) we can prove the following
Proposition 2 Let n
n−1 > a ≥ 1.
(A) If there are 3 Þrms then merger of two Þrms is proÞtable.
(B) For any number n of Þrms, there is a critical discriminatory power a0(n)
such that merger of m ≤ n − 1 is never proÞtable for all contests with a ≤
a0(n).
(C) Let a ∈
³
1, n(n−1)
(n−1)2+1
´
and n ≥ 4. Then the following two statements
hold true: If merger by a speciÞed number of Þrms is not proÞtable for the
merging Þrms, merger by a smaller number of Þrms is also not proÞtable.
If merger by a speciÞed number of Þrms is proÞtable for them, merger by a
larger number of Þrms is also proÞtable.
(D) If a ∈
h
n(n−1)
(n−1)2+1 ,
n
n−1
´
then for any number n ≥ 4 of Þrms merger of any
number m = 2, 3, ..., n of Þrms is proÞtable.
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Proof. For part (A) note that g(3, 2, a) = B
36
(7a− 6). For part (B) note
that lima→0 g(n,m, a) = − (n−m)(m−1)n(n−m+1) B < 0. The proof of part (C) follows
the lines of proof of result D in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983): prop-
erties (i) and (iii) imply that g(n,m, a) becomes negative for small m > 1
if a < n(n−1)
(n−1)2+1 . Note that
n(n−1)
(n−1)2+1 =
(n−1)2
(n−1)2+1
n
n−1 with the Þrst term on the
right-hand side being smaller than 1. According to property (iv), g(n,m, a)
is continuous and strictly convex with regard to m. Thus, because of prop-
erty (ii), there is a unique y∗ < n such that g(n, y∗, a) = 0 and the result
follows. Finally, for the proof of (D), it is straightforward to see that, in
this case, properties (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) imply that g(n,m, a) > 0 for all
m = 2, 3, ..., n. ¤
Intuitively, cooperation that makes Þrms inM to concentrate their eﬀort
on one of their products has two eﬀects. First, it increases total proÞt of
the industry, because total contest eﬀort is reduced with a reduction in the
number of contestants. Second, the share of industry proÞt that goes to the
cooperating group of Þrms is reduced. Proposition 2 shows that the prof-
itability of cooperation depends on the discriminatory power of the contest
and on whether the Þrms that take part in the merger constitute a large
share in the total number of Þrms. If the discriminatory power is not too
large, cooperation of many Þrms can be proÞtable whereas cooperation of
few Þrms is not. However, if the discriminatory power is suﬃciently high,
mergerof any number of Þrmsis always proÞtable.10
4.2 Low discriminatory power (a < 1)
Consider next the case in which cooperation does not reduce the number of
products. The colluding Þrms take into account that an increase in contest
eﬀort on, say, the product of Þrm i ∈ M reduces the market shares of all
other Þrms products, including the shares of the Þrms in M. This latter
eﬀect will be internalized, leading to a less aggressive eﬀort choice of colluding
Þrms. This, in turn, changes the contest behavior of all other Þrms. Using
Proposition 1 for a < 1, we obtain (reduced) payoﬀ functions for the group
10We restricted attention to a < nn−1 in order to concentrate on pure strategy equilibria.
However, for a → ∞ and symmetry otherwise, with m < n, the contest is a symmetric
fully discriminatory all-pay auction. It is known (see, e.g., Hillman and Riley (1989) and
Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996)) that all Þrms payoﬀ is zero in the (mixed strategy)
equilibrium for this type of contest, whether Þrms cooperate or not.
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M of colluding Þrms as
πM =
m(xµ)
a
m(xµ)a +
P
k∈U(xk)a
B −mxµ (7)
and for each non-cooperating Þrm u ∈ U as
πu =
(xu)
a
m(xµ)a +
P
j∈U(xj)a
B − xu. (8)
Maximization of (7) yields a Þrst-order condition for the choice of xµ
which, after using symmetry for eﬀorts of non-cooperating Þrms that is de-
noted as xu, becomes
a(xµ)
a−1(n−m)(xu)aB = [m(xµ)a + (n−m)(xu)a]2, (9)
and maximization of (8) with respect to xu for u ∈ U yields a Þrst-order con-
dition for the choice of non-cooperating Þrms which, after using symmetry,
becomes
a(xu)
a−1((n−m− 1)(xu)a +m(xµ)a)B = [(n−m)(xu)a +m(xµ)a]2. (10)
This system of two equations determines xµ and xu, but is not analytically
solvable, except for some special cases. This makes it impossible to compare
the equilibrium proÞts mπ∗(n) of the M-group in the fully non-cooperative
equilibrium with the equilibrium proÞts with collusion. However, we can
solve three partial problems. First, we Þnd
Proposition 3 At eﬀort values of the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, non-
cooperating Þrms react to a marginal joint reduction in eﬀort among colluding
Þrms by an increase in their contest eﬀort.
A proof is in the Appendix. If the Þrms in the colluding group M uni-
formly choose an eﬀort level that is slightly lower than the eﬀort level x∗(n)
in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, the Þrms outside this group antic-
ipate this, and they choose higher eﬀorts. As this holds for any size of the
group M , Proposition 3 describes that eﬀorts of the Þrms in M and the
eﬀorts of the Þrms that do not cooperate are strategic substitutes locally
at the fully non-cooperative equilibrium. This result contributes to the dis-
cussion on whether advertising redistributes market shares or increases the
total market. The empirical study by Roberts and Samuelson (1989), for
instance, Þnds negative conjectural variations: A Þrm i expects that other
Þrms reduce their advertizing if i increases its advertising eﬀort on some of
10
its brands. This negative slope of reaction functions is considered as coun-
terintuitive if advertising is an activity that reallocates market shares in a
market of given size. The negative slope is in line with advertising being
a voluntary contribution to a collective good that increases the size of the
whole market. Proposition 3 shows that the empirical Þnding by Roberts
and Samuelson (1989) is also compatible with advertising as an activity that
reallocates shares in a market of given size: reaction functions in contests
can have negative slope in some range of the strategy space, and the slope is
negative at the non-cooperative equilibrium.11
Proposition 4 A marginal joint reduction (increase) in eﬀort among col-
luding Þrms which is observed by non-cooperating Þrms before they choose
their eﬀort increases their proÞt if the discriminatory power of the contest is
smaller (bigger) than n(m−1)
m(n−2) .
A proof is in the appendix. Proposition 4 says that, if the colluding Þrms
can choose eﬀort as a Stackelberg leader, they can always do better than in
the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. To do this they choose eﬀort
that is smaller (larger) than the Nash equilibrium eﬀort if a is suﬃciently
small (large). Intuitively, the direct eﬀect of cost savings from reduced eﬀort
within the colluding group outweighs the direct eﬀect of reduced market
share and the indirect eﬀect of non-cooperating Þrms changes in eﬀort if the
discriminatory power of the contest is suﬃciently small.12
Let us return to simultaneous eﬀort choices and consider the comparison
of proÞts in the fully non-cooperative equilibrium and in the equilibrium
with m colluding Þrms. As pointed out above, for the general case with a,
n and m arbitrary, the problem of comparing these payoﬀs is not tractable,
because it is not possible to calculate closed-form solutions for the eﬀorts
in the equilibrium with collusion from (9) and (10). However, closed form
solutions for eﬀorts can be obtained for the case m = n − 1. Note that this
also includes the interesting case with n = 3 and m = 2. From (9) and
11Given that strategic complementarity or substitutability of eﬀort choices is not a
global property in contests, it is not surprising that the empirical results on strategic
substitutability by Roberts and Samuelson (1989) are not uncontroversial (see, e.g., Seldon,
Banerjee ad Boyd, 1993).
12Proposition 4 is of particular importance if collusion is interpreted in a broader sense,
allowing for strategic arrangements among the merged Þrms. For instance, merger may
lead to a holding company with a number of semi-independent Þrms, each choosing the
contest eﬀort for one brand. In this case, by way of appropriate incentive contracts for the
CEOs of these single Þrms, the holding can implement any equilibrium choice of contest
eﬀort, in which case the result in Proposition 4 suggests that there is always a type of
collusion that is proÞtable.
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(10) we obtain xµ =
a(n−1)aB
((n−1)a+(n−1))2 and xu = (n− 1)xµ. Inserting in (7) and
comparing this proÞt with (n− 1)π∗(n) yields
πM − (n− 1)π∗ =
(n−1)B
(n−1)+(n−1)a − a(n−1)
a(n−1)B
((n−1)a+(n−1))2 − (n−1)Bn + aB(n−1)
2
n2
(11)
This expression is positive for all a ∈ (0, 1], as can be seen numerically from
Figure 1 which depicts the proÞt gain from collusion for B = 1, and we
obtain from (11) limn→∞(πM − (n− 1)π∗) = aB.
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Figure 1. ProÞt gain of m = n− 1 colluding Þrms
We summarize this result as
Proposition 5 Collusion of n− 1 Þrms is always proÞtable for a ∈ (0, 1].
5 Discussion and conclusions
If we compare cooperation of a subgroup of Þrms in markets with promotional
contests with cooperation in Bertrand or Cournot markets, we Þrst observe
that the cooperating groups choice of their number of products becomes
important. Firms may or may not want to keep the number of brands they
had prior to cooperation. We found that cooperating Þrms may reduce their
number of products on which they spend sales eﬀort. Furthermore, we found
that the crucial determinants for this decision are the convexity properties
of the contest success function. With high discriminatory power (increasing
returns to scale) Þrms will concentrate their eﬀort on one product (or brand),
with low discriminatory power (decreasing returns) they will keep the whole
range of products (or brands) and will equally spread out their eﬀorts.
12
The results on proÞtability of cooperation with or without a reduction of
products are less straightforward than in Bertrand or Cournot competition.
As is known from Deneckere and Davidson (1985), strategic complementarity
as in the Bertrand competition case is suﬃcient for proÞtability. In contests,
strategic complementarity or substitutability of contest eﬀorts of diﬀerent
contestants is not a global property and changes across the strategy space.
This fact makes it impossible to rely on the straightforward reasoning as
used, for instance, in the Bertrand competition case. Nevertheless, we found
that cooperation can be proÞtable in contests. Generally, cooperation tends
to be proÞtable if the number of cooperating Þrms is comparatively large or
if the total number of Þrms is comparatively small. Also, cooperation tends
to be proÞtable if the discriminatory power in the contest is high.
A question which we did not address here is whether the cooperation of
Þrms increases welfare. In the context considered here, cooperation which
reduces the number of products (merger) reduces total contest eﬀort.13 How-
ever, whether a reduction in total contest eﬀort reduces or increases welfare
depends on the nature of eﬀort. For instance, if this eﬀort is sales eﬀort, the
welfare eﬀect depends on how eﬀort aﬀects consumers. Consumers may ap-
preciate eﬀort for its intrinsic value or for its information value. Also, eﬀort
may change customers rents from consuming the product. Finally, eﬀort can
be pure waste or can have characteristics of a transfer.
6 Appendix
Consider the eﬀect of a symmetric marginal reduction in eﬀort choices by
the contestants in M on their equilibrium proÞts. The Þrst-order condition
(10) determines how contestants in U will react to an anticipated reduction
in xµ. DeÞne this function as
xu = ξ(xµ) ≡ argmax
xk≥0
{qkB − xk | xi = xµ ∀i ∈M and xj = xu ∀j ∈ U\{k}} .
(12)
It is clear that such xu exists by standard Þxed point arguments. ξ is
implicitly determined by (10). We call ξ the symmetric reaction function
of the non-cooperating Þrms for eﬀort choices of the cooperating Þrms. At
the fully non-cooperative equilibrium x∗(n), the slope of the function ξ is
13This is always the case in the symmetric case with merger. Whether collusion reduces
total contest eﬀort or not is less straightforward because of the negative reaction as in
(13).
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obtained by total diﬀerentiation of (10) and equals
dξ(x)
dx
¯¯¯¯
x=x∗
= − am(n− 2)
(n− am)(n− 1) + am . (13)
The slope of the reaction function ξ at the fully non-cooperative Nash equi-
librium as in (13) is strictly negative for all n ≥ 3 and m ≤ n − 1. To see
this, note that a ≤ n
n−1 . This conÞrms Proposition 3. ¤
Consider now Proposition 4. As ∂πk
∂xk
= 0 and ∂πi
∂xk
= − 1
n−1 for i 6= k at
the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with eﬀorts as in (3), the proÞt
increase of each Þrm in the merging group M from a joint reduction in their
contest eﬀort x starting in (x∗, x∗) equals
−dπi
dx |x=x∗
=
1
n− 1
µ
(m− 1) + (n−m) dξ(x)
dx
¯¯¯¯
x=x∗
¶
. (14)
This condition resembles condition (5) in Gaudet and Salant (1991) who
consider Cournot competition. Inserting (13) yields
−dπi
dx |x=x∗
> 0 iﬀ a <
n(m− 1)
m(n− 2)
which conÞrms Proposition 4. ¤
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